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 Comes now the Commonwealth of Virginia, and, pursuant to this 
Court‟s Order, files this supplemental brief responding to the questions 
posed by the Court. 
   RESPONSES TO THE COURT’S QUESTIONS 
1. When applicable, does the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 
7421(a), deprive a federal court of subject-matter 
jurisdiction? See J.L. Enochs v. Williams Packing & 
Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1962). If so, does it divest 
federal courts of jurisdiction in this case? See Bob Jones 
University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736-48 (1974).  
 
 In most cases, when the text of the Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”) 
applies, the federal courts are divested of jurisdiction over challenges to 
the collection of Federal taxes.  See Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 
U.S. 725, 749 (1974) (“[T]he Court of Appeals did not err in holding that 
§ 7421(a) deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to issue the 
injunctive relief petitioner sought.”); Estate of Michael v. Lullo, 173 F.3d 
503, 506 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The Anti-Injunction Act withdraws all courts‟ 
jurisdiction over suits filed „for the purposes of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax.‟”).  If a plaintiff‟s claim falls within 
the AIA‟s bar, the AIA “„require[s] that the legal right to the disputed 
sums be determined in a suit for refund.‟” Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 736 
(quoting J.L. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 
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7 (1962).  However, both the  Supreme Court and this Court have noted 
there are exceptions to the AIA that allow the federal courts to retain 
jurisdiction over challenges that would halt such collection efforts.  See, 
e.g., South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984); United Mine 
Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal 
Company, 99 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 1996).  This is such a case. 
The inapplicability of the AIA‟s bar to Virginia‟s claims in this suit 
is settled law.  In Regan, 465 U.S. at 378-80, the Court held that 
the Anti-Injunction Act‟s purpose and the circumstances of 
its enactment indicate that Congress did not intend the Act 
to apply to actions brought by aggrieved parties for whom it 
has not provided an alternative remedy.  In this case, if the 
plaintiff South Carolina issues bearer bonds, its bondholders 
will, by virtue of § 103(j)(1), be liable for the tax on the 
interest earned on those bonds.  South Carolina will incur no 
tax liability.  Under these circumstances, the State will be 
unable to utilize any statutory procedure to contest the 
constitutionality of § 103(j)(1).  Accordingly, the Act cannot 
bar this action. 
 There can be no serious dispute that Virginia‟s claims in this case 
fall squarely within the Regan exception.  As Secretary Sebelius 
conceded below, Virginia will never pay the penalty.  (J.A. at 49).  She 
also noted that if a State is “not the taxpayer, it could not bring a 
refund claim.” (J.A. at 159). Because Virginia will incur no direct 
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financial liability under the penalty, it “will be unable to utilize any 
statutory procedure to contest the constitutionality” of the penalty.  
Regan, 465 U.S. at 380.  Accordingly, as in Regan, the AIA “cannot bar 
this action.”  Id.  
 Virginia‟s claim in this regard is actually stronger than South 
Carolina‟s in Regan.  In Regan, the Court recognized but rejected the 
argument that “the State may obtain judicial review of its claims by 
issuing bearer bonds and urging a purchaser of those bonds to bring a 
suit . . . .”  Id.  Here, Virginia is denied even that inadequate remedy 
because only Virginia has standing to defend its code of laws.  Diamond 
v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986) (“Because the State alone is entitled 
to create a legal code, only the State has the kind of „direct stake‟ 
identified in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 740, in defending the 
standards embodied in that code.”).  Given that the only way in which 
the injury to Virginia‟s sovereign interests, i.e., the sweeping aside of a 
Virginia statute, can be addressed is through this suit, the AIA does not 
serve as a bar to Virginia‟s action. 
Such a result is consistent with this Court‟s prior applications of 
the Regan exception.  In Leckie, this Court held that 
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we find that the debtors do not have any “alternative legal 
way” to challenge the imposition of Coal Act successor 
liability on the purchasers of their assets and that, 
consequently, neither the tax-exclusion provision of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act nor the Anti-Injunction Act 
barred the district courts from reaching the merits of the 
cases and ordering the appropriate relief. 
 
Leckie, 99 F.3d at 584.1  Because Virginia has no “alternative legal way” 
to challenge the insult to its sovereignty caused by the purported 
invalidation of a law duly enacted by the General Assembly and signed 
by the Governor, Virginia‟s claims fit squarely within the Regan 
exception, and therefore, the federal courts have jurisdiction.2 
Even without the Regan exception, the AIA does not bar Virginia‟s 
claims in this case. The AIA speaks in terms of “any person,” a 
                                            
1 Because the AIA does not bar this action, the Declaratory Judgment 
Act‟s exception for actions involving taxes does not bar the action either.  
Leckie, 99 F.3d at 583-84 (holding that the AIA and the tax-exclusion 
provision of the Declaratory Judgment Act “are, in underlying intent 
and practical effect, coextensive. . . . In light of the two provisions‟ 
coextensive nature, a finding that one of the two statutes does not bar 
[the suit] will necessitate a finding that the other statute does not pose 
an obstacle either.”) (citations omitted).  Under Leckie, the Court should 
find that, because the South Carolina v. Regan exception to the AIA 
applies, the tax-exclusion provision of the Declaratory Judgment Act 
could not bar the action.  Leckie, 99 F.3d at 584.  
2 The Secretary argued the bar of the AIA below.  The district court 
rejected the argument, holding that “this Court believes it is clear that 
the Regan exception applies in this case.”  Commonwealth of Virginia v. 
Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 604 (E.D. Va. 2010).  The Secretary chose 
not to appeal that aspect of the district court‟s ruling. 
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formulation that does not include a State.  See, 1 U.S.C. § 1; 26 U.S.C. § 
7343; 26 U.S.C. § 7701.  It is a canon of federal statutory interpretation 
that, unless Congress has clearly manifested a different intention, the 
word “person” in a federal statute shall not be interpreted as including 
a State.  In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 529 
U.S. 765, 780-81 (2000), the Supreme Court emphasized the 
longstanding interpretive presumption that “person” does 
not include the sovereign.  See United States v. Cooper Corp., 
312 U.S. 600, 604, 85 L. Ed. 1071, 61 S. Ct. 742 (1941); 
United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 275, 91 L. Ed. 
884, 67 S. Ct. 677 (1947). . . .  The presumption is, of course, 
not a “hard and fast rule of exclusion,” Cooper Corp., 312 
U.S. at 604-605, but it may be disregarded only upon some 
affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary.   
This view has been repeatedly adopted by both the Fourth Circuit and 
by other federal circuit courts of appeals.  See, e.g., United States v. Bly, 
510 F.3d 453, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (Motz, J., concurring in judgment) 
(“The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that the „presumption 
that “person” does not include the sovereign” in federal statutes is 
„longstanding.‟”); Stoner v. Santa Clara County Office of Education, 502 
F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Regence Blue Cross 
Blueshield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702, 717 (10th Cir. 2006); Linder v. Calero-
Portocarrero, 251 F.3d 178, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  Because the Secretary 
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has not and cannot point to any affirmative evidence of statutory intent 
to apply the AIA to a sovereign State, she has failed to overcome the 
general presumption that “person” in a statute does not include the 
sovereign; consequently, the AIA simply has no application to Virginia‟s 
claim.  
2. Can a court determine that a challenged exaction qualifies 
as a “tax” for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act without 
reaching the question of whether the exaction qualifies as a 
“tax” for purposes of Art. I, § 8, cl. 1? Compare Bailey v. 
George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922), with Bailey v. Drexel Furniture 
Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922). 
 
 While it is true that, on the same day in 1922, the Supreme Court, 
in Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922), held that the bar of the AIA 
applied to the collection of what the Supreme Court found to be a 
regulatory penalty in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), 
that was not the Supreme Court‟s final word on the subject. Later that 
same year, the Court decided Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922), 
which held that, when the Internal Revenue Service “demand[s] 
payment of a penalty . . . [the AIA], which prohibits suits to restrain 
assessment or collection of any tax, is without application.”  See also 
Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386 (1922) (same); Robertson v. 
United States, 582 F.2d 1126, 1127 (7th Cir. 1978) (finding the 
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Marijuana Transfer Tax analogous to the “tax” at issue in Lipke and 
holding that “[t]he Anti-Injunction Statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7421 is 
inapplicable to a case involving the collection of an assessment under 
the Marijuana Transfer Tax. The district court‟s grant of the 
government‟s motion to dismiss is therefore erroneous.”). 
Addressing the argument that the Lipke line of cases had been 
implicitly overruled, the Robertson court said: 
The government asserts that the decisions in Lipke and 
Tovar were implicitly overruled by the decisions in Enochs v. 
Williams Packaging [sic] & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 82 S. 
Ct. 1125, 8 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1962), and Bob Jones University v. 
Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 94 S. Ct. 2038, 40 L. Ed. 2d 496 (1974). 
We reject the government‟s assertion. Neither Williams 
Packaging [sic] nor Bob Jones University involved the 
exaction of a purely regulatory tax. These cases involved 
federal social security taxes (FICA), federal unemployment 
taxes (FUTA), and federal income taxes, all of which are 
clearly revenue-raising. Bob Jones University v. Simon, 
supra at 725 n. 12, 94 S. Ct. 2038.  The decisions in Williams 
Packaging [sic] and Bob Jones University did not make any 
express determination as to the different treatment afforded 
regulatory taxes as opposed to revenue-raising taxes under 
the Anti-Injunctive Statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7421. 
 
Id. at 1127-28.  This view is consistent with a decision of this Court, 
which cited Lipke with approval in finding that the analogous Tax 
Injunction Act, which bars the federal courts from enjoining the 
collection of state taxes, does not prohibit federal courts from enjoining 
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penalties that are imposed under the guise of taxation.  Lynn v. West, 
134 F.3d 582, 595 (4th Cir. 1998).  
 Because of the Lipke line of cases, a federal court must ordinarily 
determine whether what PPACA expressly denominates as a penalty is 
a penalty or a tax before it can determine whether the AIA bars the 
action.  However, because of the Regan exception, this Court need not 
reach the question of whether the penalty “qualifies as a „tax‟ for 
purposes of Art. I, § 8, cl. 1” in Case No. 11-1057. 
3. Assuming the Anti-Injunction Act does apply in this case, 
does a plaintiff have the ability to challenge the exaction 
provided by § 5000A in a refund suit or otherwise? See 26 
U.S.C. § 7422(a); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1340, 1346. 
 
 If a plaintiff‟s claim falls within the AIA‟s bar, the AIA “„require[s] 
that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for 
refund.‟”  Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 736 (quoting Williams Packing, 370 
U.S. at 7).  But for the ability to address the issue in a refund suit, the 
AIA‟s bar would violate the Constitution‟s guarantee of due process.  
Professional Engineers, Inc. v. United States, 527 F.2d 597, 600 (4th Cir. 
1975) (“Application of the Anti-Injunction Statute is not a denial of due 
process as long as the taxpayer has access to judicial review in a refund 
action.”). 
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 It is undisputed that the Commonwealth of Virginia does not have 
the ability to raise its claim in a refund action. The Secretary conceded 
that Virginia will never pay the PPACA penalty, (J.A. at 49), and noted 
that if a State is “not the taxpayer, it could not bring a refund claim.”  
(J.A. at 159).  Because Virginia will incur no direct financial liability 
under the penalty, it “will be unable to utilize any statutory procedure 
to contest the constitutionality” of the penalty.  Regan, 465 U.S. at 380.  
Thus, there is no opportunity for Virginia or anyone else to raise 
Virginia‟s claims of a sovereign injury in a refund action, and therefore, 
the AIA cannot bar Virginia‟s claims in this suit.3 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
3 Virginia‟s suit seeks to defend its own code of laws.  Such a claim 
cannot be raised by anyone entitled to bring a refund suit because, as 
the Supreme Court has noted, only a State has standing to defend its 
code of laws.  Diamond, 476 U.S. at 65 (“Because the State alone is 
entitled to create a legal code, only the State has the kind of „direct 
stake‟ identified in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 740, in defending 
the standards embodied in that code.”).     
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